Arguably the most successful tactic of the Peruvian government was the utilization of rondas campesinas, or peasant patrols. 21-35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992257. The Libyan Arab Armed Forces: A Hybrid Armed Actor? Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004. Before expanding into urban areas, the insurgents spread their influence throughout the highlands. Peruvian Emergency Zones 1981-1990[xlvi]. This was done to both exert their power and to ensure that all excess food was given to the Senderistas. [xxii] They were largely comprised of rural youth, who felt the Peruvian state offered them little chance of upward mobility. The explosions happened on Avenida Larco, in the business area of Miraflores, an upscale district of the city. [lxvii] It is clear that the government and military have mostly abandon their counterinsurgency tactics in an attempt to keep their brutality in the past. In addition, Guzmán himself served as one of the organization’s greatest strengths. In 1971 Guzmán became the Director of Personnel, which allowed him to control the hiring and firing of faculty members. Strong, Simon. The Shining Path spread easily throughout Ayacucho as the population was severely impoverished. Accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/recent-attack-police-shows-shining-path-still-strong. [xvii] Gordon McCormick, “The Shining Path and the Future of Peru,” p. 15. Although the Peruvian government employed several successful tactics, which led to the capture of Guzmán and a de-escalation of violence, they made numerous errors and, therefore, prolonged the conflict. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is a Maoist faction of the Peruvian Communist Party that began its armed struggle against the Peruvian government in 1980. They have recommitted themselves to their cause and adopted a “FARC-like strategy,” which depends on narco-trafficking profits. Earlier in December 2005, five police officers were killed in the town of He began the use of intelligence agencies to sniff out Shining Path leaders. Manwaring, Max G. “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Path Beckons.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 541 (1995): 157-166, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1048282. Some atrocities were committed by the National Intelligence Service, notably the La Cantuta massacre, the Barrios Altos massacre and the Santa massacre. However, this severely backfired “as the marketing ban shut off a source of social interchange and economic income so long a fulcrum of Andean life.”[xxxii] Furthermore, instances of Senderistas ordering rural youth, often their main link to these communities, to kill cattle forced them to reevaluate their loyalties. Simon Strong argues, “[Shining Path’s] existence made a mockery of twelve years of military rule, while its public acknowledgement might look as if the military were trying to prolong its stay in power.”[liii] The missteps of the Peruvian government often aided the Shining Path in recruiting members to its cause. The insurgents followed “an ideology that made violence an absolute value rather than a relative or proportionate instrument.”[xxiv] Furthermore, violence was viewed as a purification method. The commander who replaced Guzmán was later captured by Peruvian authorities in 1999, after which the group splintered into small factions. Thus, they were easily swayed to surrender themselves under the Repentance Law, especially after Guzmán’s capture significantly lowered morale. During the 18 months preceding his capture, approximately 3,600 Senderistas and rank-and-file members were either captured or surrendered themselves. 651-666. Peru's Shining Path rebel movement is a shadow of the feared group that carried out attacks in the 1980s and early 1990s but the country faces another growing threat - drug-trafficking. Furthermore, Guzmán, affectionately referred to as Comrade Gonzalo, effectively portrayed himself as an almost godlike figure to his followers, many of whom were enamored by him despite never meeting him. In 1964 the PCP became split between pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing factions, with the PCP-Bandera Roja, or ‘Red Flag,’ aligning themselves with Maoist teachings. Overall, despite numerous errors on the side of the Peruvian government, they were able to effectively decapitate the Shining Path and greatly reduce their activity within Peru. Additionally, this brought greater attention to and increased sympathy for the Shining Path’s cause. Description: The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. In 1980, during the early days of the “People’s War,” nobody could have guessed that a fringe leftist movement would become a legitimate threat against the Peruvian government. Stern, Steve J. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. On July 16, 1992, Shining Path guerrillas detonated a car bomb in Lima’s upscale district of Miraflores, killing 25 and injuring dozens. With violent activity occurring as recently as March 18, 2017, it is clear the Shining Path has not been completely eradicated. As early as 1979, naval and army intelligence were aware of the Shining Path’s training for the eventual “People’s War.” However, these were easily dismissed as too small and too remote. To atone for the atrocities committed during the counterinsurgency, the government greatly reduced their intelligence capabilities. Yaworsky, William. Finally, by offering amnesty to the insurgents the government not only denied Shining Path leaders their followers, but also offered an invaluable source of intelligence to the counterinsurgents. Required fields are marked *. Orin Starn was a young anthropologist in the mid-1980s doing research in Peru when, one day, the small town where he was staying was suddenly … “Recent Attack on Peru Police Shows Shining Path Still Strong.” InSight Crime, March 20, 2017. [x] Guzmán and the Shining Path exploited this isolation and the economic crisis of this region to gain support for their movement. Co-authors Miguel La Serna and Orin Starn in Peru researching the Shining Path. In its heyday in the 1980s, the Shining Path was the most formidable rebel movement in Latin America, waging a brutal war with the Peruvian state. An additional fissure took place within the ranks of the PCP-Bandera Roja in 1967 as a result of further infighting between the leadership and those members who called for violent revolutionary action. Today, Peru is one of the safest countries to visit in South America, with petty theft being the most common crime- a far cry from the violence and terrorism that plagued its past. The subsistence crisis is most shocking when analyzing per capita income in the region, “which fell 20 percent in the 1970s to about $60 to $70 by the early 1980s.”[ix] In addition, the majority of the population was indigenous and spoke Quechua, which further disconnected them from the Spanish-speaking government. by Scott Englund and Michael Stohl. They successfully infiltrated cities by decentralizing the organization into five autonomous zones: south, central, Lima, southwest, and north. [xii] The violence quickly escalated throughout Peru as the insurgency turned into the bloodiest campaign in the country’s memory. The Shining Path’s home base of Ayacucho proved to be strategically advantageous for numerous reasons. 569-592. http://www.jstor.org/stable/424776. The Challenge of the Shining Path The Shining Path is a terrorist organization founded by university professor Abimael Guzman in the remote Andean highlands of Ayacucho during the 1960s and 1970s. This position proved crucial as it enabled him to create a cycle of indoctrination: radical professors recruited students, who became teachers and, upon graduating, returned to their villages to spread Guzmán’s message.[viii]. Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed the Shining Path (SL) in Peru in the late 1960s; his teachings created the foundation of SL's militant Maoist doctrine. The Shining Path suffered because of their brutality, inflexible ideology, and their abandonment of their projected goals: to protect and improve the economic situation of the indigenous and rural populations. Kent, Robert B. As the Shining Path attacked civilians among the local population who they considered “class enemies”, using increasingly gruesome methods of murdering their victims; and as they showed more and more disrespect for the indigenous culture they had claimed to honor, the villagers began to fight back by forming “rondas” patrols. Shining Path Attacks Natural Gas Pipeline Camp February 18, 2014 8:48 am by Andean Air Mail & PERUVIAN TIMES Views: 1580 Peru’s Armed Forces said Monday that remnants of the Shining Path rebel group attacked a natural gas work camp in the country’s southern Cusco region. The Shining Path movement was borne at the San Cristobál de Huamanga University, led by a communist professor of philosophy, Abimael Guzmán. In one incident that took place in March of 1983, a rondas village patrol killed 13 “senderistas,” along with the Shining Path “commander” of the town of Lucanamarca. It largely drew its support from university students and professors, as well as highland farmers and the urban poor of Lima. Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956. Furthermore, the insurgency was born out of economic hardships and feelings of isolation. Woy-Hazleton, Sandra and William A. Hazleton. Making Sense of Iran and al-Qaeda’s Relationship, Understanding the New U.S. Despite numerous reports of military abuses, which are discussed below, the military presence showed the rural peasants that the Shining Path was not their only option. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” p. 23. 48-84. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010306. [xii] Carlos Iván Degregori, “The Origins and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views” in Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru, pp. The Shining Path of Peru. “Peru,” in Richard F. Staar (ed. Copyright © 2014-2020 Kuoda Tours, LLC. As Lewis Taylor explains, “The personality cult ultimately proved to be Sendero’s Achilles’ heel, in that the General Secretary’s arrest dented severely cadre morale and undermined the belief of many grass-roots Party members in a victorious outcome.”[xli], Strengths of the Peruvian Government and Military, Although the counterinsurgency efforts of the Peruvian government were often marred with allegations of human rights violations, they were able to adapt their strategies to effectively take advantage of the anti-insurgent momentum of the mid-1980s. [xxxviii] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 237. [xxx], The most significant weakness of the Shining Path may have been their inability to fully understand the social norms and practices of the rural peasants and Indians, those populations they claimed to be fighting for. Peru has indeed made great political and economic strides in the last two decades. The Shining Path was founded in 1969 by Abimael Guzmán, a former university philosophy professor (his followers referred to him by his nom de guerre Presidente Gonzalo), and a group of 11 others. 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Analyzing the Shining Path’s insurgency has been remarkable in that neither side’s tactics were decisive in declaring a victor. Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997. Under the guise of a pro-Indian movement, the Shining Path initially appealed to the most isolated sectors of Peruvian society. [v]“Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Peru Support Group (2003), p.7. It will be interesting to monitor how the government handles another counterinsurgency. Guzmán was heavily influenced by a trip to China and admired the teachings of Mao Zedong. Although the Shining Path has carried out attacks in recent years, it has been on a much smaller scale. Using several of Joes’ “Elements of a Counterinsurgency Strategy” as a framework, this section will analyze the government’s weaknesses. [lviii] Often young men were rounded up and interrogated as suspected guerrillas. The military control of these zones led to the installment of the Civil Guard. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” Third World Quarterly 12 (1990): p. 21. The rural population largely distrusted the Civil Guard as they were forced to live with their brutality. [i] “Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Peru Support Group (2003), p.1. Next, the strengths and weaknesses of the Shining Path is analyzed. 22-23. What Laws Constrain This Russian Private Military Company? If the government had focused on the civil pillar of counterinsurgency they would have effectively addressed the root causes of the insurgency and further destabilized the Shining Path’s support base. They were put through increasingly difficult tasks, which culminated in the killing of a police officer and stealing his weapon. [xxxi]Carlos Iván Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 138. They believed the fear of violent retribution was sufficient motivation to persuade even the most resistant peasants. [xxxiii]Carlos Iván Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 144. [vii] Thus, under the direction of Abimael Guzmán, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) was formed in 1970. Through the framework of Anthony James Joes’ “Elements of a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” this paper will analyze how the Peruvian government effectively decapitated the Shining Path, but failed to address the root causes of the insurgency.[iv]. They were frequently beaten and taken to prison in Lima if coincidental evidence was found to confirm insurgent-related activity. [lxvi]Leonardo Goi, “Recent Attack on Peru Police Shows Shining Path Still Strong,” InSight Crime, March 20, 2017, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/recent-attack-police-shows-shining-path-still-strong. According to researchers, Shining Path’s basic strategy was to use violence to bring down the country’s imperfect democratic institutions, prevent citizens from participating in local government, destroy Peru’s economy, and to thwart government-sponsored programs to provide aid and services to the population. [xxxv] Ron, James. However, in an effort “to mobilize and unify the broadest level of anti-government sentiment,” several organisms were formed. © Copyright 2021 | Site by 3C Web Services, by CIMSEC — Center for International Maritime Security, by Joint Special Operations University Press, by Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, by Air University: Wright Flyer Paper No. First, the origins of the insurgency, to include the socio-economic climate of the 1970s and 1980s, is discussed as a means of contextualizing the root causes. [xxiii], While the Shining Path’s spread of influence was greater than anticipated, their increasingly brutal tactics disenfranchised many of their rank-and-file members. [xlvii] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” p. 225. [vii]Gordon McCormick, “The Shining Path and the Future of Peru,” p. 4. “Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation.” Journal of Peace Research 38 (2001): p. 577. Sara Blake is a Master of Public Policy student at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, concentrating her graduate degree on national security. [xxi]  These groups allowed the Shining Path to operate freely within Peru’s democratic society. [xxviii] William Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of US Army Psychological Operations.” Journal of Strategic Studies 32 (2009): p. 653. Under the administration of Alberto Fujimori the state started its widespread use of intelligence agencies in its fight against Shining Path. [liii] Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1992) p. 22. Guzmán retained tight control over the organization, ensuring the decision-making processes were highly centralized, despite its reach throughout the country. [xxxvi] Guzmán justified this massacre by claiming that they were sending a message to the Peruvian Armed Forces: “[…] we were ready to do anything, anything.”[xxxvii] He believed that fear was the most useful tool in recruiting those more reluctant to join the revolution. The Shining Path broke into factions and additional leaders were captured, officially ending the conflict by 2000. [lxi] The disproportionate number of casualties was a clear sign of the military’s penchant for using excessive force. [lxv]Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. An estimated 70,000 people died, most of which were ordinary civilians. [xxvii], Another significant weakness of the Shining Path was their inability to find sanctuary and outside support. As the Shining Path attacked civilians among the local population who they considered “class enemies”, using increasingly gruesome methods of murdering their victims; and as they showed more and more disrespect for the indigenous culture they had claimed to honor, the villagers began to fight back by forming “rondas” patrols. Joes, Anthony James. [xxv] Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956, p. 213. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006. [xi] Max G. Manwaring, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Path Beckons.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 541 (1995): p. 158. [xl] Lewis Taylor, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997, p. 169. McClintock, Cynthia. The Shining Path retaliated by murdering 69 villagers, mostly children, the youngest of whom was only six months old. [xxxv] Their most infamous case was the 1983 Lucanamarca Massacre. [xxvi] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 237. According to the Peruvian sponsored Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as many as 70,000 Peruvians were killed throughout the insurgency. [lvii] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 237. Additionally, many people fled emergency zones and contributed to the high number of displaced people throughout the insurgency, which further worsened the economic situation of Peru. [lxvi] Because Peru enjoyed a relatively peaceful period during the early 2000s the government was lulled into a false sense of calm, which has left them unprepared for the recent resurgence of Shining Path activity. Their reign of terror declined sharply, becoming limited to isolated incidents in the early 21st century. Under President Fujimori, the Law of Repentance was enacted, which “granted amnesty or reduced jail terms for individuals who chose ‘voluntarily’ to abandon armed struggle and collaborate with the authorities by betraying their erstwhile comrades.”[l] Many rank-and-file members of the Shining Path, particularly young, unemployed men, did not hold the strong convictions of the Senderistas. The ability of the Peruvian government to successfully divide leaders of the Shining Path from their followers via emergency zones is problematic to analyze. … [xxiii] Carlos Iván Degregori, How Difficult it is to be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980-1999 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012) p. 136. The Tarata bombing was a terrorist attack in Lima, Peru, on 16 July 1992, by the Shining Path terrorist group. [xlii] These groups along with the declaration of states of emergency (referred to as emergency zones) allowed the government to separate the insurgent leaders from their followers. [lxii] Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. The Geographical Review 83 (Oct 1993): p. 447. To inquire and begin planning your handcrafted Peru vacation itinerary, contact a Kuoda Travel Designer today. [lviii]Ronald H. Berg, “Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas” in Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru, pp. Burgoyne, Michael L., “Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight Against Sendero Luminoso.” Military Review (2010): pp. [xlv] Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. Recruitment increased as a new wave of students and supporters of the revolutionary left swelled the ranks of the Shining Path.[lxii]. Both sides resorted to brutal tactics to intimidate their allies and enemies. Therefore, it was not difficult to encourage rebellious sentiment in a population that felt more or less abandoned by the Peruvian government. Additionally, the passing of the Repentance Law offered the rank-and-file members of the Shining Path amnesty or reduced sentences, while also providing the government with much needed intelligence on the insurgents’ locations and plans.[xliii]. DOI: 10.1080/01402390902987087. Abimael Guzman, the leader of the Shining Path terrorist group, was captured by police on Sept. 12, 1992. As previously mentioned, these areas were relatively isolated so the Shining Path faced little ideological competition. Woy-Hazleton, Sandra. In the 1980s in Peru, Sendero Luminoso(the Shining Path) was a feared and brutal revolutionary organization. attacks by the Shining Path on a military outpost had caused the death of a civilian and injuries to three soldiers (EFE 21 Dec. 2005). Although not without its critics, “the massive expansion of the organizations in 1990 and 1991 corresponded to a 30 percent decline in recorded casualties and deaths in the departments of Andahuaylas, Apurímac, Ayacucho, and Junín.”[xlviii] Furthermore, in 1992 President Fujimori (1990-2000) passed a national law that gave the ronderos the right to bear arms. The government began to amend its strategies by the late 1980s, but few of their tactics were overwhelmingly successful. [xix] Max G. Manwaring, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Path Beckons.” p. 160. Guerrillas presumed by the police to be members of the Maoist movement Shining Path set off a huge car bomb early this morning in front of the American Embassy … [xxxii] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 236. Taylor, Lewis. Description. Unfortunately, the Shining Path ostracized themselves from other communist regimes as they made disparaging statements against the Soviet Union and China, which they described as ‘revisionist.’[xxviii] Furthermore, they refused to cooperate with the other leftist organizations within Peru. The emphasis was too heavily placed on the security pillar, which often led to abuses committed by the military. The Geographical Review 83 (Oct 1993): p. 447. As military and police atrocities became less frequent throughout the second half of the 1980s, community groups such as the rondas began to take over policing duties. The Tarata bombing, as it became known, was the Shiny Path’s deadliest single act of violence. Little attention was paid to the group as they were thought of as a radical, regional group, but their violence increased by the end of the year when citizens found dead dogs hanging from lampposts. Shining Path is active again in the area, providing the locals with such practical help as dental and barber services, distribution of food, and teaching … Thus, crimes as small as petty theft resulted in the beheading of the offender. [xlii] Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, pp. 94. [lxviii] The government appears to have forgotten that lack of development and economic stagnation were two of the root causes that permitted the Shining Path’s ideology to spread so quickly throughout Peru. [xxxvi] Carlos Basombrío Iglesias, “Sendero Luminoso and Human Rights: A Perverse Logic that Captured the Country” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 434. Military power now became predominant, and government forces unfortunately committed many human rights violations of their own in their attempts to suppress the Shining Path. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” Third World Quarterly 12 (1990): pp. Small Wars Journal is published by Small Wars Foundation - a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation. The most active and violent period of the insurgency lasted from 1980-1995. Leader Abimael Gúzman Reynoso, also known as Comrade Gonzalo, a charismatic scholar, believed and taught the Maoist philosophy of violent agrarian revolution. As is common in counterinsurgencies, the abuses of the military further isolated the rural populations and pushed them into the arms of the insurgents. “Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” World Politics 3 (October 1984): pp. His version was the following five-point program that would culminate in the overthrow of the Peruvian government: “(1) agitation and armed propaganda; (2) sabotage against Peru’s socioeconomic system; (3) the generalization of the guerilla struggle; (4) the conquest and expansion of the revolution’s support base and the strengthening of the guerilla army; and (5) general civil war, the siege of the cities, and the final collapse of state power.”[xvii] He may very well have completed all five phases had he not been captured in 1992. [xix] Therefore, recruits were required to pass through a rigorous vetting process to test their devotion to the group. [xviii] While this image fostered group unity, it proved highly detrimental to their long-term success as the group largely disintegrated after his capture. [lxvii]Michael L. Burgoyne, “Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight Against Sendero Luminoso,” p. 70. Peru Support Group, The Findings of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In the 1980s, SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. Overall, the most significant error committed by the Peruvian government was their failure to adequately address both the security and civil pillars of counterinsurgency. [xxxi] Additionally, in territories controlled by the Shining Path, they attempted to “strangle” cities and towns by prohibiting the sale of surplus crops. [ii] These groups felt neglected, both socially and economically, by the government. The assassination of the three policemen in the VRAEM is a sign that the Shining Path’s presence in Peru’s largest coca-growing region remains strong. 232-245. Although the Shining Path had sympathizers throughout the country, it is their rigorous recruitment process of their active members, or Senderistas, that offers insight into the dedication of the movement. The Shining Path’s attacks were not limited to the countryside. Thus, it is imperative to remember that the government’s failure to address the root causes of the insurgency has allowed the group to remain active in the Andean highlands. As Lewis explains, “Unfortunately for the Peruvian armed forces, upon their arrival in Ayacucho they possessed minimal knowledge about PCP-SL organistational structures and membership.”[lxiii] To further complicate this issue, many of the security forces deployed to Ayacucho came from other departments. On April 5, 1992, he dissolved the Congress of Peru and suspended the Constitution, which began the Peruvian Constitutional Crisis of 1992; he drafted a new Constitution, which imposed a state of emergency and curfews. 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